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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 13-1216 
___________ 
 
ROBERT BROWN, 
                   Appellant 
 
v. 
 
HENRY COLLINS 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil No. 2-12-cv-02265) 
District Judge:  Honorable Petrese B. Tucker 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted for Possible Summary Action Pursuant to  
Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
April 4, 2013 
 
Before:  SCIRICA, HARDIMAN and GREENAWAY, JR., Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: April 17, 2013 ) 
_________ 
 
OPINION 
_________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 Robert Brown, proceeding pro se, sued defendant Henry Collins under Title VII of 
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, alleging that he had been employed by Collins as a janitor 
for several years but was paid below minimum wage for his work.  Collins moved for 
2 
 
judgment on the pleadings pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c), arguing among other things 
that because he had never employed fifteen or more employees, he was not an 
“employer” for purposes of coverage under Title VII.  See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b).  The 
District Court determined that because Collins did not meet the § 2000e(b) threshold, it 
lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the action.  Accordingly, the District Court granted 
Collins‟ motion and dismissed the suit with prejudice.  Brown now appeals. 
 We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
1
  We review de novo the 
District Court‟s grant of a motion for judgment on the pleadings under Rule 12(c).  
DiCarlo v. St. Mary Hosp., 530 F.3d 255, 259 (3d Cir. 2008).  “Judgment will only be 
granted where the moving party clearly establishes there are no material issues of fact, 
and that he or she is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”  Id. 
 The District Court erred in its determination that it lacked subject matter 
jurisdiction.  “[T]he fifteen-employee threshold is a substantive element (whether an 
„employer‟ exists) of a Title VII claim and is not jurisdictional.”  Nesbit v. Gears 
Unlimited, Inc., 347 F.3d 72, 83 (3d Cir. 2003).  However, we conclude that we can 
affirm on other grounds.  Murray v. Bledsoe, 650 F.3d 246, 247 (3d Cir. 2011).  Because 
Collins was not an “employer” for the purposes of Title VII, see 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b), he 
was entitled to judgment as a matter of law.  See Nesbit, 347 F.3d at 89.  Accordingly, 
                                              
1
 Although the District Court‟s docket indicates that Collins‟ answer included a 
counterclaim, Collins did not caption it as such and we construe that filing merely as 
preserving Collins‟ right to filed a post-trial motion pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(d) for 
attorney‟s fees.  He has not filed such a motion, and the District Court‟s dismissal of 
Brown‟s complaint is therefore final and appealable.   
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the District Court did not err in granting his motion for judgment on the pleadings.
2
  
Brown‟s appeal therefore presents no substantial question, and we will summarily affirm.  
See 3d Cir. L.A.R. 27.4 and 3d Cir. I.O.P. 10. 
                                              
2
  The District Court correctly denied Brown‟s motion for recusal as that motion was 
based solely on Brown‟s dissatisfaction with the Court‟s earlier denial of his motion for 
default judgment.  See Securacomm Consulting, Inc. v. Securacom Inc., 224 F.3d 273, 
278 (3d Cir. 2000) (“We have repeatedly stated that a party‟s displeasure with legal 
rulings does not form an adequate basis for recusal.”).  We note that Brown captioned his 
suit as arising under Title VII and did not object to Collins‟ characterization of his claim 
as one of discrimination; however, his complaint may be construed as sounding under the 
provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq.  If so, it nevertheless 
failed to state a claim that is plausible on its face.  Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 
(2009).  Although a district court should generally give leave to amend prior to 
dismissing under such circumstances or make its own determination whether any 
amendment would be futile, Simmons v. Abruzzo, 49 F.3d 83, 87 (2d Cir. 1995), we are 
satisfied that the District Court did not abuse its discretion by dismissing Brown‟s 
complaint without leave to amend.  Cf. Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 
114 (3d Cir. 2002).  To the extent Brown argued that Collins otherwise infringed his 
constitutional rights, he cannot recover under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 because he alleges 
nothing suggesting that Collins “acted under color of state law.”  Great Western Mining 
& Mineral Co. v. Fox Rothschild LLP, 615 F.3d 159, 175-76 (3d Cir. 2010).   
